We show a model construction for a system of higher-order illative combinatory logic Iω, thus establishing its strong consistency. We also use a variant of this construction to provide a complete embedding of first-order intuitionistic predicate logic with second-order propositional quantifiers into the system I0 of Barendregt, Bunder and Dekkers, which gives a partial answer to a question posed by these authors.
Introduction
Illative systems of combinatory logic or lambda-calculus consist of type-free combinatory logic or lambdacalculus extended with additional constants intended to represent logical notions. In fact, early systems of combinatory logic and lambda calculus (by Schönfinkel, Curry and Church) were meant as very simple foundations for logic and mathematics. However, the Kleene-Rosser and Curry paradoxes led to this work being abandoned by most logicians.
It has proven surprisingly difficult to formulate and show consistent illative systems strong enough to interpret traditional logic. This was accomplished in [BBD93] , [DBB98a] and [DBB98b] , where several systems were shown complete for the universal-implicational fragment of first-order intuitionistic predicate logic.
The difficulty in proving consistency of illative systems in essence stems from the fact that, lacking a type regime, arbitrary recursive definitions involving logical operators may be formulated, including negative ones. In early systems containing an unrestricted implication introduction rule this was the reason for the Curry's paradox [BBD93, CFC58, §8A] , where an arbitrary term X is derived using a term Y satisfying Y = β Y ⊃ X. For an overview of and introduction to illative combinatory logic see [BBD93] , [Sel09] or [CFC58] .
Systems of illative combinatory logic are very close to Pure Type Systems. The rules of illative systems, however, have fewer restrictions, judgements have the form Γ ⊢ t where t is an arbitrary term instead of Γ ⊢ N : C. This connection has been explored in [BD05] where some illative-like systems were proven equivalent to more liberal variants of PTSs from [BD01] . Those illative systems, however, differ somewhat from what is in the literature.
In [Cza11] an algebraic treatment of a combination of classical first-order logic with type-free combinatory logic was given. On the face of it, the system of [Cza11] seems to be not quite like traditional illative combinatory logic, but the methods used in the present paper are a (substantial) extension of those from [Cza11] .
In this work we construct a model for a system of classical higher-order illative combinatory logic I c ω , thus establishing a strong consistency result. We also use a variant of this construction to improve slightly on the results of [BBD93] . We show a complete embedding of the system PRED2 0 of first-order intuitionistic many-sorted predicate logic with second-order propositional quantifiers into the system I 0 which is an extension of IΞ from [BBD93] .
The classical variant PREDω c is defined by adding to PREDω the law of double negation as an axiom
where ⊥ ≡ ∀x o .x o and x o ∈ V o . The system PRED2 0 is the fragment of second-order many-sorted predicate calculus restricted to formulas in which second-order quantifiers are only propositional. It is obtained from PREDω by dropping the rule conv, restricting the types to T ::= o | B | B → T and changing the definition of terms to
For an arbitrary set ∆ we write ∆ ⊢ S ϕ if ϕ is derivable from a subset of ∆ in system S. We drop the subscript when obvious or irrelevant. Note that we trivially have weakening with this definition, i.e., if ∆ ⊢ ϕ then ∆ ′ ⊢ ϕ for any ∆ ′ ⊇ ∆. In the rest of this section we assume a fixed set of base types and fixed sets of constants Σ τ for each type τ ∈ T . We assume T , T τ , etc. to refer either to PREDω or PRED2 0 , depending on the context.
The systems contain only ⊃ and ∀ as logical operators. However, it is well-known that all other connectives may be defined from these with the help of the second-order propositional universal quantifier.
We denote by t[x/t ′ ] a term obtained from t by simultaneously substituting all free occurences of x with t ′ .
• D τ is nonempty for any τ ,
• for any d 1 ∈ D τ1→τ2 and d 2 ∈ D τ1 we have
• I(c) ∈ D τ for any c ∈ Σ τ .
A valuation is a function that, for all types τ , maps V τ into D τ . When we want to stress that a valuation is associated with a structure M, we call it an M-valuation. If u is a valuation, d ∈ D τ and x τ is a variable of type τ , then by u[x τ /d] we denote a valuation u ′ such that u ′ (y) = u(y) for y = x τ and u(x τ ) = d. For a given structure M and an M-valuation u, an interpretation u M (sometimes abbreviated by ) is a function mapping terms of type τ to D τ , and satisfying the following:
• x u = u(x) for a variable x,
• c u = I(c) for c ∈ Σ τ ,
• t 1 t 2 u = t 1 u · t 2 u .
For a formula ϕ, a state s and a valuation u we write s, u M ϕ if s ∈ ς( ϕ u M ). Given a set of formulas ∆, we use the notation s, u M ∆ if s, u M ϕ for all ϕ ∈ ∆. We drop the subscript M when obvious or irrelevant.
A Kripke model is a Kripke pre-model M satisfying the following for any state s and any valuation u:
Theorem 2.7. The conditions ∆ ϕ and ∆ ⊢ ϕ are equivalent.
Proof. By induction on the length of derivation we first show that ∆ ⊢ ϕ implies ∆ ϕ. Note that it suffices to show this for finite ∆. The implication is obvious for the axiom. Assume ∆ ⊢ ϕ was obtained by rule ∀ i . Then ϕ = ∀x.ψ for x ∈ V τ , x / ∈ F V (∆ To prove the other direction, we assume that ∆ 0 ϕ 0 and construct a Kripke model M and a valuation u such that for some state s of M we have s, u M ∆ 0 , but s, u M ϕ 0 .
First, without loss of generality, we assume that there are infinitely many variables not occuring in the formulas of ∆ 0 . We can do this because extending the language with infinitely many new variables is conservative. The states of M are consistent sets of formulas ∆ ′ ⊇ ∆ 0 , i.e., ∆ ′ ⊢ ⊥, which differ from ∆ 0 by only finitely many formulas. The ordering is by inclusion. For any type τ as D τ we take the set of terms of type τ . Let v be a valuation. Given a term t, we denote by t v a term obtained from t by simultaneously substituting any variable x ∈ F V (t) by the term v(x). We obviously assume that no variables are captured in these substitutions, which is possible because we treat formulas up to α-equivalence. We define the interpretation I by I(c) = c. We also set t 1 · t 2 = t 1 t 2 . Notice that now t v = t v . Further, we define the function ς of M as follows: ς(ϕ) = {∆ | ∆ ⊢ ϕ} for a formula ϕ, where ∆ ranges over sets of formulas which are valid states. Note that ∆, v M ϕ is now equivalent to ∆ ⊢ ϕ v . Finally, we set u(x) = x. Given a formula φ, a state ∆, and a valuation v, we show by induction on the size of φ that ∆, v M φ satisfies the conditions required for a Kripke model. If φ = ϕ ⊃ ψ, then we need to check that ∆ ⊢ ϕ v ⊃ ψ v iff for all ∆ ′ ⊇ ∆ such that ∆ ′ is a valid state and ∆ ′ ⊢ ϕ v , we have ∆ ′ ⊢ ψ v . Suppose the right side holds and take ∆ ′ = ∆ ∪ {ϕ v }. If ∆ ′ is a valid state then ∆ ′ ⊢ ψ v , hence by rule ⊃ i we obtain ∆ ⊢ ϕ v ⊃ ψ v . Because ∆ extends ∆ 0 by finitely many formulas, so does ∆ ′ . Hence if ∆ ′ is not a valid state, then it is inconsistent. Then obviously ∆ ′ ⊢ ψ v anyway, so we again obtain the left side by applying rule ⊃ i . The other direction follows by applying ⊃ e and weakening finitely many times.
Similarly, if ψ = ∀x.ϕ, then without loss of generality we assume v(x) = x, x ∈ V τ , and check that ∆ ⊢ ∀x.ϕ v iff for all valid states ∆ ′ ⊇ ∆ and all t 1 ∈ D τ we have
If the right side of the equivalence holds, then it holds in particular for t 1 = y such that y / ∈ F V (∆, ϕ v ), and ∆ ′ = ∆. Such y exists, because we have assumed an infinite number of variables not occuring in the formulas of ∆ o , and ∆ extends ∆ o by only finitely many formulas. By rule ∀ i we obtain ∆ ⊢ ∀ y ϕ v , which is α-equivalent to the left side, and we treat α-equivalent formulas as identical. Conversely, if ∆ ⊢ ∀x.ϕ v , then by rule ∀ e and weakening we obtain
It is now a matter of routine to check that M is a Kripke model. Obviously, in this model we have
On the other hand, ∆ 0 , u ψ for every ψ ∈ ∆ 0 . This proves the theorem.
Illative systems
In this section we define the higher-order illative systems I ω , I c ω and the second-order illative system I 0 . We also define a semantics for these systems.
Definition 3.1. By T(Σ) we denote the set of type-free lambda-terms over some specific set Σ of primitive constants, which is assumed to contain Ξ, L and A τ for each τ ∈ B where B is some specific set of base types.
We use the following abbreviations. The term ⊃ is usually written in infix notation and is assumed to be right-associative.
The constant Ξ functions as a restricted quantification operator, i.e., ΞAB is intuitively interpreted as ∀x.Ax ⊃ Bx. The intended interpretation of LA is "A is a type", or "A may be a range of quantification". The term H stands for the "type" of propositions, and F AB denotes the "type" of functions from A to B. The constants A τ denote base types, i.e., different sorts of individuals. We use a notion of types informally in this section.
For systems of illative combinatory logic, judgements have the form Γ ⊢ t where Γ is a finite subset of T(Σ) and t ∈ T(Σ). The notation Γ, t is an abbreviation for Γ ∪ {t}.
The system I ω is defined by the following axioms and rules.
Axioms
(
Rules
Eq :
The system I c ω is I ω plus the axiom of double negation:
where ⊥ = ΞHI.
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The system I 0 is I ω minus the rule F L . The rule F L allows us to quantify over functions and predicates. Obviously, the system becomes more useful if for τ ∈ B we can add constants c representing some elements of type τ , axioms A τ c, and some axioms of the form e.g. p(f c 1 )(gc 2 ) where f , g are constants representing functions and p is a predicate constant (i.e. of type τ 1 → τ 2 → o). That most such simple extensions are consistent with I ω is a consequence of the model construction in Section 4.
For an arbitrary set Γ, we write Γ ⊢ I t if there is a finite subset Γ ′ ⊆ Γ and a derivation of Γ ′ ⊢ t in an illative system I. The subscript is dropped when obvious from the context. Lemma 3.2. The following rules are admissible in I ω and I 0 .
Proof. Routine.
Definition 3.3.
A combinatory algebra C is a tuple C, ·, S, K , where · is a binary operation in C and S, K ∈ C, such that for any X, Y, Z ∈ C we have:
To save on notation we often write X ∈ C instead of X ∈ C. We assume · associates to the left, and sometimes omit it. A combinatory algebra is extensional if for any M 1 , M 2 ∈ C, whenever for all X ∈ C we have
It is well-known that any combinatory algebra contains a fixed-point combinator and satisfies the principle of combinatory abstraction, so any equation of the form z · x = Φ(z, x), where Φ(z, x) is an expression involving the variables z, x and some elements of C, has a solution for z satifying this equation for arbitrary x.
Definition 3.4. An illative Kripke pre-model for an illative system I (I ∈ {I ω , I c ω , I 0 }) with primitive constants Σ, is a tuple S, ≤, C, I, ς , where S is a set of states, ≤ is a partial order on the states, C is an extensional combinatory algebra, I : Σ → C is an interpretation of primitive constants, and ς is a function assigning upward-closed (w.r.t. ≤) subsets of S to elements of C. We sometimes write σ M , S M , etc., to stress that they are components of M.
Given an illative Kripke pre-model M, the value t u M of term t under valuation u, which is a function from variables to C, is defined inductively:
• c u = I(c) for a constant c,
Note that the element in the last point is uniquely defined because of extensionality and combinatorial completeness of C.
To save on notation, we often confuse
The intended meaning is always clear from the context. The subscript M is also often dropped.
Intuitively, for X ∈ C the set ς(X) is the set of all states s such that the element X is true in s. The relation ≤ on states is analogous to an accessibility relation in a Kripke frame.
An illative Kripke model for I ω is an illative Kripke pre-model where ς satisfies the following conditions for any X, Y ∈ C:
(1) if s ∈ ς(LX) and for all s ′ ≥ s and all Z ∈ C such that s ′ ∈ ς(XZ) we have s
(2) if s ∈ ς(ΞXY ) then for all Z ∈ C such that s ∈ ς(XZ) we have s ∈ ς(Y Z), (3) if s ∈ ς(LX) and for all s ′ ≥ s and all Z ∈ C such that s ′ ∈ ς(XZ) we have s
An illative Kripke model for I 0 is defined analogously, but omitting condition (4). A model is a classical illative model if it satisfies the law of double negation: if s ∈ ς(HX) and s ∈ ς((X ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) then s ∈ ς(X), where ⊥ = ΞHI. It is not difficult to see that every one-state illative Kripke model is a classical illative model. For a classical illative model with a single state s we define the set T of true elements by T = {X ∈ C | s ∈ ς(X)}. Note that ς(X) may be empty.
For a term t and a valuation u, we write s, u M t whenever s ∈ ς( t u M ). For a set of terms Γ, we write Γ I t if for all Kripke models M of an illative system I, all states s of M, and all valuations u such that s,
is always an upward-closed subset of S, for any argument X.
Informally, one may think of illative Kripke models as combinatory algebras with an added structure of a Kripke frame. (1) if s ∈ ς(HX) and for all s Proof. We first check that Γ ⊢ I t implies Γ I t, by a simple induction on the length of derivation. It suffices to prove this for finite Γ. The implication is immediate for the axioms. Now assume Γ ⊢ t 2 t was obtained by rule Ξ e , and we have s, u M Γ. Hence, by the inductive hypothesis s, u M Ξt 1 t 2 and s, u M t 1 t, which by condition (2) in Definition 3.4 implies s, u M t 2 t. Assume Γ ⊢ Ξt 1 t 2 was obtained by rule Ξ i , and that s, u M Γ. Let s ′ ≥ s and Z ∈ C be such that s
So by the inductive hypothesis we obtain s ′ , u
We therefore obtain by condition (1) in Definition 3.4 that s, u M Ξt 1 t 2 . The other cases are equally straightforward and we leave them to the reader. In the case of rule Eq the extensionality of C is needed.
To prove the other direction, we assume Γ 0 I t 0 , and construct an illative Kripke model M and a valuation u such that for some state s of M we have s, u M Γ 0 , but s, u M t 0 .
We construct the model as follows. First of all, we assume without loss of generality that there are infinitely many variables not occuring in Γ 0 . As states we take all sets of terms Γ ′ ⊇ Γ 0 which extend Γ 0 by only finitely many formulas. The ordering is by inclusion. The combinatory algebra C is the set of equivalence classes of βη-equality on T(Σ). We denote the equivalence class of a term t by [t] βη . We define I(c) = [c] βη for c ∈ Σ. The function ς is defined by the condition: Γ ∈ ς([t] βη ) iff Γ ⊢ I t and Γ is a valid state. This is well-defined because of βη-equality in rule Eq. The valuation u is defined by
We now show that this is an illative Kripke model. We only need to check the conditions on ς. It is obvious that ς(X) is upward-closed for any X ∈ C because of weakening. Assume that Γ ⊢ Lt 1 , and for all Γ ′ ⊇ Γ and all terms t 3 such that Γ ′ ⊢ t 1 t 3 we have Γ ′ ⊢ t 2 t 3 . Then, in particular, this holds for Γ ′ = Γ ∪ {t 1 x} and t 3 = x, where x is a variable, x / ∈ F V (Γ, t 1 , t 2 ). Such a variable x exists because Γ differs from Γ 0 by only finitely many formulas, and there are infinitely many variables not occuring in the formulas of Γ 0 . Therefore, by rule Ξ i we have Γ ⊢ Ξt 1 t 2 , hence Γ ∈ ς([Ξt 1 t 2 ] βη ). This verifies condition (1). Conditions (2), (3), (4) and (5) are verified in a similar manner, using rules Ξ e , Ξ H , F L and H i , respectively. Condition (6) is immediate from the axiom Γ ⊢ LH. Condition (7) follows from the axioms Γ ⊢ LA τ for τ ∈ B.
It is obvious that
Clearly, we also have Γ 0 , u M t for all t ∈ Γ 0 . This proves the theorem.
Remark 3.7. Note one subtlety here. The above theorem does not imply that I 0 or I ω is consistent. This is because we allow trivial Kripke models, i.e., ones such that ς(X) = S for any X ∈ C, and it is not obvious that nontrivial ones exist. Indeed, if we dropped the restriction s ∈ ς(LX) in condition (1) in Definition 3.4, then all illative Kripke models would be trivial. To see this, let X ∈ C and s ∈ S be arbitrary and consider the element Υ ∈ C defined by the equation Υ = Υ ⊃ X. Note that dropping s ∈ ς(LX) in condition (1) in Definition 3.4 means dropping s ∈ ς(HX) in condition (1) in Fact 3.5. For any s ′ ≥ s we obviously have s ′ ∈ ς(Υ ⊃ X) whenever s ′ ∈ ς(Υ). By condition (2) in Fact 3.5 we conclude that s ′ ∈ ς(X) whenever s ′ ∈ ς(Υ). Therefore, by condition (1) in Fact 3.5, we have s ∈ ς(Υ). Hence, s ∈ ς(Υ ⊃ X) as well, so again s ∈ ς(X). Thus ς(X) = S. This argument is essentially Curry's paradox.
For convenience of reference we state the following simple fact about one-state classical illative models for I c ω , as we will be constructing such a model in the next section. Recall that for a classical illative model with a single state s, the set T of true elements is defined by T = {X ∈ C | s ∈ ς(X)}. (1) if LX ∈ T and for all Z ∈ C such that XZ ∈ T we have Y Z ∈ T , then ΞXY ∈ T ,
The model construction
In this section we construct a model for I c ω . The construction is parametrized by a full model for classical higher-order logic.
Definitions
In this subsection we give definitions necessary for the construction and fix some notational conventions.
Definition 4.1.1. We define the set of types T + by the following grammar:
where B is a specific finite set of base types. Intuitively, the type o is the type of propositions, ω is the type of arbitrary objects, ε is the empty type.
For the sake of simplicity we use the following notational convention: we sometimes write τ → ε for ε when τ = ε, ε → τ for ω, and τ → ω for ω. There is never any ambiguity because τ → ε etc. are not valid types according to the grammar for T + . This convention is only to shorten some statements later on. We also use the abbreviation τ n 1 → τ 2 for τ 1 → . . . → τ 1 → τ 2 where τ 1 occurs n times (possibly n = 0).
✷ From now on we fix a full model N = {D τ | τ ∈ T }, I of classical higher-order logic and construct a one-state classical illative model M for I c ω . We assume that T ⊂ T + defined above corresponds exactly to the types of N , and that the base types B correspond exactly to the base types used in the definition of the syntax of I c ω . We will define the universe of the model as the set of equivalence classes of a certain relation on the set of type-free lambda-terms over a set Σ + of primitive constants, to be defined below. We assume these terms to be different objects than the terms of the syntax of I c ω . We also treat lambda-terms up to α-equivalence, i.e., terms differing only in the names of bound variables are considered identical. Definition 4.1.2. We define a set of primitive constants Σ + , and a set of canonical terms as follows. First, for every type τ = ω we define by induction on the size of τ a set of canonical terms of type τ , denoted by T τ . We also define a set of constants Σ τ for every type τ / ∈ {ω, ε} ∪ {ω → τ ′ | τ ′ ∈ T + }, i.e., we leave Σ τ undefined if τ is not of the form required. First, we set T ε = ∅. In the inductive step we consider possible forms of τ . If τ ∈ T (i.e. it does not contain ω or ε) then we define Σ τ to contain a unique constant for every element d ∈ D τ . We set T τ = Σ τ . If τ / ∈ T , τ = τ 1 → τ 2 and τ 1 = ω, then denote by Σ τ a set of new constants for every (set-theoretical) function from T τ1 to T τ2 . Again we set T τ = Σ τ . If τ = ω → τ 2 then T τ consists of all terms of the form λx.ρ where ρ ∈ T τ2 .
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The symbol Σ A stands for a set consisting of distinct new constants A τ for each base type τ ∈ B. Finally, we set
For the sake of uniformity, we use the notation T ω for the set of all type-free lambda terms over Σ + . Note that terms in T ω are not necessarily canonical and all canonical terms are closed. Note that for τ ∈ T the set Σ τ contains a unique constant for every element of D τ . Hence for each τ ∈ T there is a natural bijection from Σ τ onto D τ . We denote this bijection by π τ .
We now define a mapping F such that for ρ ∈ T τ1→τ2 we have F (ρ) :
, and both π τ1 and π τ2 are defined. In this case we set
∈ T and τ 1 = ω then also T τ1→τ2 = Σ τ1→τ2 and by our construction to each c ∈ Σ τ1→τ2 corresponds a set-theoretical function f c from T τ1 to T τ2 . In this case we set F (c) = f c . Finally, if ρ ∈ T ω→τ then ρ = λx.ρ ′ and by F (ρ) we denote the constant function from T ω to T τ whose value is always ρ ′ . Note that because N is assumed to be a full model, so by our construction if τ 1 → τ 2 ∈ T 1 and τ 1 = ω then for every set-theoretical function f from T τ1 to T τ2 there exists a constant ρ f ∈ Σ τ1→τ2 such that
By ⊤ ∈ Σ o we denote the constant corresponding to the element
Note that if τ 1 , τ 2 = ω and τ 1 = τ 2 then T τ1 ∩ T τ2 = ∅. Hence every canonical term ρ may be assigned a unique type τ = ω such that ρ ∈ T τ . When talking about the canonical type, or simply the type, of a canonical term we mean the type thus defined. ✷ An n-ary context C is a lambda-term over the set of constants Σ + ∪{✷ 1 , . . . , ✷ n }, where ✷ 1 , . . . , ✷ n / ∈ Σ + . The constants ✷ 1 , . . . , ✷ n are the boxes of C. If C is an n-ary context then by C[t 1 , . . . , t n ] we denote the term C with all occurences of ✷ i replaced with t i for i = 1, . . . , n. Unless otherwise stated, we assume that the free variables of t 1 , . . . , t n do not become bound in C[t 1 , . . . , t n ]. By a context we usually mean a unary context, unless otherwise qualified. In this case we write ✷ instead of ✷ 1 .
In what follows α, β, etc. stand for ordinals; t, t 1 , t 2 , r, r 1 , r 2 , q, q 1 , q 2 etc. stand for type-free lambda-terms over Σ + from which we build the model; c, c 1 , c 2 , etc. stand for constants from Σ + ; τ , τ 1 , τ 2 , etc. stand for types; ρ, ρ 1 , ρ 2 stand for canonical terms (i.e. terms ρ ∈ T τ for τ = ω); and C, C ′ , C 1 , C 2 , etc. denote contexts; unless otherwise qualified.
The following simple fact states some easy properties of canonical terms. It will sometimes be used implicitly in what follows. (1) ρ ≡ λx 1 . . . x n .c where n ≥ 0, c ∈ Σ τ for some τ (so τ = ω → τ 1 ), and ρ ∈ T ω n →τ ,
For each ordinal α we inductively define reduction systems R α and R α , a relation ∼ α between terms and types in T + , and a relation ≻ α between terms and canonical terms. Formally, all these notions are defined by one induction in a mutually recursive way, but we split up the definitions for the sake of readability. These definitions are monotone with respect to α, so the induction closes at some ordinal, i.e., the relations do not get larger after this ordinal.
First, let us fix some notations. We write R <α for β<α R β , ≻ <α for β<α ≻ β , ∼ <α for β<α ∼ β . We use the notation ≡ for identity of terms up to α-equivalence. By → ≤α we denote the reduction relation of R α , by → ≡ ≤α the reflexive closure of → ≤α , by ։ ≤α the transitive reflexive closure of → ≤α , and by = ≤α the transitive reflexive symmetric closure. We write [t] α for the equivalence class of a term t w.r.t. the relation = ≤α . Analogously, we use the subscript <α for relations corresponding to R <α , and =α for relations corresponding to R α . We drop the subscripts when they are obvious or irrelevant.
Notation 4.1.4.
In what follows a term of the form Kt should be read as λx.t where x / ∈ F V (t), a term Ht as Lλx.t where x / ∈ F V (t), and F t 1 t 2 as λf.Ξt 1 (λx.t 2 (f x)). We adopt this convention to shorten notations. ✷ Before embarking on the task of rigorously constructing the model we explain the intuitive meaning of various notions formally introduced later. This is necessarily informal and at points rather vague.
Informally speaking, we identify types with sets of terms. A base type corresponds to the set of all constants of this type, the type o to the set of all propositions, the type ω to the set of all terms, the type ε to the empty set, and a function type τ 1 → τ 2 to the set of all terms t such that for all terms t 1 of type τ 1 the term tt 1 has type τ 2 . It is known at the beginning of the transfinite inductive definition exactly which terms have base types, but not so for type o or function types. During the course of the induction new terms may obtain types. If r is a term, and α an ordinal, then by r ❀ α ⊤ we mean that at stage α in the induction, r has been shown to be "true". If r ≡ F A τ1 A τ2 t, we interpret this as saying that, at stage α in the induction, the term t has been shown to have type τ 1 → τ 2 . It may be that for all β < α we may have
So the fact that t has type τ 1 → τ 2 becomes known only at stage α of the induction. Our induction stops when no new typings may be obtained and no new terms may become true or false, i.e., when we have all information we need to construct the model.
Note that canonical terms may obtain types different from their canonical types. For instance, a term of the form λx.c where c ∈ Σ τ will ultimately obtain the type ω and all of the types τ ′ → τ for any type τ ′ . As far as canonical terms are concerned, we mostly care about their canonical types, and it is known beforehand what types these are.
In R α we will have reduction rules of β-and η-reduction, and rules of the form cρ → F (c)(ρ), where c ∈ Σ τ1→τ2 and ρ ∈ T τ1 . We will also add some other rules to make certain terms "indistinguishable", as explained in the paragraph below.
Intuitively, t ≻ α ρ is intended to hold if ρ ∈ T τ is a "canonical" term which is "equivalent" to t in type τ , basing on the information we have at stage α. Let us give some examples to elucidate what we mean by this. For instance, suppose we have two distinct (hence disjoint) base types τ 1 and τ 2 , and two functions Id τ1→τ1 ∈ D τ1→τ1 and Id τ2→τ2 ∈ D τ2→τ2 which are identities on D τ1 and D τ2 respectively. In Σ + we will have two canonical constants id τ1→τ1 and id τ2→τ2 of type τ 1 → τ 1 and τ 2 → τ 2 respectively, associated with the functions Id τ1→τ1 and Id τ2→τ2 , i.e., such that
The reduction rules associated with id τ1→τ1 will be id τ1→τ1 c → c for every canonical constant c of type τ 1 , and analogously for id τ2→τ2 . Note that id τ1→τ1 c will not form a redex if c is a canonical constant of type different from τ 1 . Now we have both λx.x ≻ 1 id τ1→τ1 and λx.x ≻ 1 id τ2→τ2 , because λx.x behaves exactly like id τ1→τ1 when given arguments of type τ 1 , and exactly like id τ2→τ2 when given arguments of type τ 2 . In fact, we will define the reduction systems R α so as to make λx.x and id τ1→τ1 indistinguishable, for sufficiently large α, wherever a term of type τ 1 → τ 1 is "expected". For instance, for any reduction rule in R α of the form ρ id τ1→τ1 → c, where ρ is a canonical term of type (τ 1 → τ 1 ) → τ for some τ , we will add to R α+1 a reduction rule ρ (λx.x) → c.
In the case ρ ∈ {⊤, ⊥}, the relation t ≻ α ρ encompasses a definition of truth. The condition t ≻ α ⊤ means that t is certainly true, basing on the information from the earlier stages β < α of the inductive definition. So if t ≻ α ⊤ then t should behave like ⊤ wherever a truth-value is expected. If t ≻ α ⊥, then t is certainly not true.
If t = ρ then we never have t ≻ α ρ for a canonical term ρ of some base type τ ∈ B, because no term different from ρ behaves like ρ if the type of ρ is an atomic type different from o. Notation 4.1.5. We use the notation t ❀ α ρ when t ։ ≤α t ′ ≻ α ρ. We write ❀ <α for β<α ❀ β .
Informally, t ❀ α ρ holds if we can reduce t, using the rules of R α , to a term equivalent to a canonical term ρ in the type of ρ basing on what we know at stage α of the inductive definition. A careful reader will notice that what we ultimately really care about is the relation ❀ α , not ≻ α , because we want to identify R α -equivalent terms. The relation ≻ α is needed chiefly to facilitate the proofs.
The condition t ∼ α τ is intended to hold if t "represents" the type τ basing on what we know at stage α, i.e., it is a "predicate" which is true when applied to terms of type τ , and is never true when applied to terms which are not of type τ . In other words, Lt ❀ α ⊤ and for all terms r known to be of type τ we have tr ❀ α ⊤, but we should not have tr ❀ α ⊤ for any r which is not of type τ . So for instance for each type τ ∈ B we should have A τ ∼ α τ for sufficently large α. Because ε is the empty type, if t ∼ α ε then we should never have tr ❀ <α ⊤ for any term r. Since ω is the type of arbitrary objects we should have t ∼ α ω if for all terms r we have tr ❀ <α ⊤.
Having explained the intuitive meaning of the relations, we may proceed to formal definitions. The definition below depends on the definition of ≻ <α , and thus on ≻ β for β < α.
Definition 4.1.6. A reduction system is a set of reduction rules over a specified set of terms, i.e., a set of pairs of terms. In all reduction systems we consider we assume the set of terms to be the type-free lambda-terms over Σ + . Instead of writing t 1 , t 2 ∈ R we usually say that t 1 → t 2 is a reduction rule of R. Given a reduction system R we define its associated reduction relation → R by: t 1 → R t 2 iff there exists a context C with exactly one box and terms r 1 , r 2 such that t 1 ≡ C[r 1 ], t 2 ≡ C[r 2 ] and r 1 → r 2 is a rule of R. In contrast to all subsequent uses of contexts, here we allow the free variables of r 1 and r 2 to become bound in
We define R α to contain the following reduction rules:
• for α = 0: rules of β-and η-reduction,
• for α > 0: rules ct → ρ 2 for every c ∈ Σ τ1→τ2 (so τ 1 = ω), every ρ 2 ∈ T τ2 and every term t such that t ≻ <α ρ 1 and F (c)(
We set R α = R <α ∪ R α . ✷ Definition 4.1.7. The relation ∼ α is defined by the following rules. Recall that τ 1 → ε = ε for τ 1 = ε, ε → τ 2 = ω, and τ 1 → ω = ω.
The above definition depends on the definitions of R β , ∼ β and ≻ β for β < α. The next definition of ≻ α depends on the definitions of R β and ∼ β for β ≤ α, and on ≻ <α . Definition 4.1.8. We define the relation t ≻ α ρ for canonical terms ρ by the following conditions:
• ρ ≻ α ρ if the canonical type of ρ is o or a base type,
• t ≻ α ρ if the canonical type of ρ is τ 1 → τ 2 and t is a term such that for any t 1 ∈ T τ1 we have tt 1 ❀ <α F (ρ)(t 1 ). Note that we allow τ 1 = ω but not τ 1 = ε.
In particular, ⊤ ≻ α ⊤ and ⊥ ≻ α ⊥ by the above definition. For ρ ∈ {⊤, ⊥} we give additional postulates. For α ≥ 0 we postulate t ≻ α ⊤ for all terms t such that at least one of the following holds:
where τ ∈ B and c ∈ Σ τ , (Ξ ⊤ ) t ≡ Ξt 1 t 2 where t 1 , t 2 are terms such that there exists τ s.t. t 1 ∼ α τ and for all t 3 ∈ T τ we have
Finally, when α ≥ 0 we postulate t ≻ α ⊥ for all terms t such that:
(Ξ ⊥ ) t ≡ Ξt 1 t 2 and there exists a type τ such that:
• t 1 ∼ α τ , and
• for every term t 3 ∈ T τ we have t 2 t 3 ❀ <α ⊤ or t 2 t 3 ❀ <α ⊥,
• there exists a term t 3 ∈ T τ with t 2 t 3 ❀ <α ⊥.
The intuitive interpretation of Ξt 1 t 2 is restricted quantification ∀x.t 1 x ⊃ t 2 x, but t 1 is required to represent a type, if Ξt 1 t 2 is to have a logical value. In illative combinatory logic the notions of being (representing) a type and being eligible to stand as a quantifier range are equivalent. It turns out that the types of I c ω are just the types defined by T + . This explains putting t 1 ∼ α τ in some of the cases above.
During the course of the transfinite inductive definition some previously untyped terms t will obtain types, e.g. a statement of the form F A τ1 A τ2 t will become true at some stage α. At that point we need to decide which term among the canonical terms of type τ 1 → τ 2 behaves exactly like t. The whole correctness proof rests on the fact that this decision is always possible. That we may choose such a canonical term implies that quantifying over only canonical terms of a certain type τ is equivalent to quantifying over all terms of type τ . This justifies restricting quantification to canonical terms in the above definition of t ≻ α ⊤.
Let us now give some examples illustrating the above definitions.
Example 4.1.9. Suppose we have a base type τ and Id ∈ D τ →τ is the identity function on D τ . Let
e., Id(c) = c for any c ∈ Σ τ . There is a constant id ∈ Σ τ →τ such that F (id) = Id. We show λx.x ≻ 1 id. Let c ∈ Σ τ = T τ . We have (λx.x)c → <1 c, because R <1 = n<1 R n = R 0 and R 0 contains the rules of β-reduction. We also have c ≻ <1 c ≡ F (id)(c) by the first part of Definition 4.1.8. Therefore (λx.x)c ❀ <1 c. Since c ∈ Σ τ was arbitrary, we obtain λx.x ≻ 1 id by the second part of Definition 4.1.8. Now we show that λyx.x ≻ 2 λy.id. We have λy.id ∈ T ω→τ →τ . So let t ∈ T ω . We have (λyx.x)t → <2 λx.x. We already proved that λx.x ≻ 1 id. Note that F (λy.id) is the constant function from T ω to T τ →τ whose value is always id. This implies that (λyx.x)t ❀ <2 id ≡ F (λy.id)(t) for any t ∈ T ω . Hence λyx.x ≻ 2 λy.id.
Let ρ ∈ Σ ((ω→τ )→τ )→τ be such that F (ρ)(f ) ≡ F (f )(λy.id) for f ∈ Σ (ω→τ )→τ . As another example we will show that λz.z(λyx.x) ≻ 4 ρ. So suppose f ∈ Σ (ω→τ )→τ = T (ω→τ )→τ . We have (λz.z(λyx.x))f → <4 f (λyx.x). We proved in the previous paragraph that λyx.x ≻ 2 λy.id. By the second part of Definition 4.1.6 we obtain f (λyx.x) → =3 F (f )(λy.id). Hence (λz.z(λyx.x))f ։ <4 F (f )(λy.id) for any f ∈ Σ (ω→τ )→τ . Obviously we have F (f )(λy.id) ≻ 0 F (f )(λy.id) by the first part of Definition 4.1.8, because the range of F (f ) is included in Σ τ . Recalling that F (ρ)(f ) ≡ F (f )(λy.id) for any f ∈ Σ (ω→τ )→τ we obtain λz.z(λyx.x) ≻ 4 ρ by the second part of Definition 4.1.8. 
Proof. Follows easily from definitions.
It follows from Lemma 4.1.10 by appealing to the well-known Knaster-Tarski fixpoint theorem that there exists an ordinal ζ such that ≻ ζ = ≻ <ζ and R ζ = R <ζ . This simple fact may also be shown directly as follows. Suppose ζ is an ordinal with cardinality greater than (T ω ∪ {✷}) 4 and there is no α < ζ such that R α = R <α and ≻ α = ≻ <α . Then for each α < ζ either R α \ R <α or ≻ α \ ≻ <α is non-empty. Because R α ⊆ T ω × T ω and ≻ α ⊆ T ω × T ω , we may thus define, using the axiom of choice, an injection f from ζ to (T ω ∪ {✷}) 4 (recall that in set theory an ordinal ζ is the set of all ordinals less than ζ). If R α \ R <α is non-empty, then let f (α) = t 1 , t 2 , ✷, ✷ where t 1 , t 2 ∈ R α \ R <α is chosen arbitrarily. Analogously, if ≻ α \ ≻ <α is non-empty, then let f (α) = ✷, ✷, t 1 , t 2 where t 1 , t 2 ∈ ≻ α \ ≻ <α is chosen arbitrarily. Since R α ⊆ R <β and ≻ α ⊆ ≻ <β for α < β, we have f (α) = f (β), so f really is an injection. But this implies that the cardinality of ζ is not greater than the cardinality of (T ω ∪ {✷}) 4 . Contradiction.
Let ζ be an ordinal such that R ζ = R <ζ and ≻ ζ = ≻ <ζ . We may assume without loss of generality that also ∼ ζ = ∼ <ζ . In what follows we will use the notations R, ≻, ❀, etc. for R ζ , ≻ ζ , ❀ ζ , etc. Definition 4.1.11. The one-state classical illative Kripke model M is defined as follows. We take the combinatory algebra C of M to be the set of equivalence classes of = R . We define the interpretation I of M by I(c) = [c] R . We define the set T of true elements of
Correctness proof
In this subsection we prove that the preceding lengthy definition of M is actually correct, i.e., that M is a classical illative Kripke model for I c ω . Below we will silently use the following simple lemma, without mentioning it explicitly every time. Proof. This follows from the fact that there are no reduction rules which involve Ξ, L, or A τ for τ ∈ B, so the reductions may happen only inside t 1 and t 2 .
Note that together with our convention stated in Notation 4.1.4 regarding the meaning of Ht 1 , Lemma 4.2.1 implies that if Ht 1 ։ t then t ≡ Ht ′ 1 where t 1 ։ t ′ 1 . The proof of the following lemma illustrates a pattern common to many of the proofs below. We give this single proof in full, but when later an argument follows this same pattern we treat only some of the cases to spare the reader excessive tedious details. Lemma 4.2.2. If x 1 , . . . , x n are variables, n ≥ 1, and C is a context, then the following conditions hold:
Proof. Induction on α. 
. Then by part (2) of the IH we have
By claim (3), which has already been verified in this inductive step, we obtain C 1 [t] ∼ α τ . By parts (1) and (2) of the IH we conclude that for all t ′ ∈ T τ we have
If condition (L ⊤ ) holds then C ≡ LC 1 and C 1 [x 1 . . . x n ] ∼ α τ for some type τ . By calim (3), which has already been verified in this inductive step, we obtain
It remains to verify the case C[x 1 . . .
Then the claim again follows by applying the already verified condition (3) and parts (1) and (2) of the inductive hypothesis. Proof. Induction on α. The non-obvious case is when Kt ≡ λf.Ξt 1 (λx.t 2 [z/f x]) ∼ α τ 1 → τ 2 is obtained by rule (F ′ ), and t 1 ∼ <α τ 1 for τ 1 = ε, and λz.t 2 ∼ <α τ 2 . But then t ≡ Ξt 1 (λx.t 2 [z/f x]) and z / ∈ F V (t 2 ). Since Kt 2 ∼ <α τ 2 by the inductive hypothesis we conclude τ 2 = ω or τ 2 = ε. In either case τ = ω or τ = ε.
The next lemma and Lemma 4.2.12 are the two key technical lemmas justifying the correctness of our model construction.
Lemma 4.2.5. For all ordinals α, β the following conditions hold:
(1) R α and R β commute, i.e., if t ։ ≤α t 1 and t ։ ≤β t 2 then t 1 ։ ≤β t ′ and t 2 ։ ≤α t ′ for some term t ′ ,
(2) if t 1 ≻ α ρ and t 1 ։ ≤β t 2 then t 2 ≻ α ρ,
if t 1 ∼ α τ and t 1 ։ ≤β t 2 then t 2 ∼ α τ ,
if t ∼ α ω then tr ❀ <α ⊤ for all r, and if t ∼ α ε then tr ❀ <α ⊥ for all r.
Proof. Induction on pairs α, β ordered lexicographically. Together with every condition we show its dual, i.e., the condition with α and β exchanged. We give proofs only for the original conditions, but it can be easily seen that in every case the dual condition follows by exactly the same proof with α and β exchanged. Note that for a proof of a condition to be a proof of its dual, it suffices that we never use the inductive hypothesis with β increased. First note that conditions (1) and (2) imply that if t 1 ❀ α ρ and t 1 ։ ≤β t 2 , then t 2 ❀ α ρ. Indeed, if t 1 ։ ≤α t ′ 1 ≻ α ρ and t 1 ։ ≤β t 2 , then by (1) we have t 2 ։ ≤α t ′ 2 and t ′ 1 ։ ≤β t ′ 2 . Hence by (2) it follows that t ′ 2 ≻ α ρ, so t 2 ❀ α ρ. Instead of (1) we prove a stronger claim that R α and R β commute. Condition (1) follows from this claim by a simple tiling argument, similar to the proof of the Hindley-Rosen lemma.
If α = β = 0 then the claim is obvious, because R 0 = R 0 is the ordinary λβη-calculus. We therefore check that R 0 commutes with R α for α > 0. We show that if t → =α t 1 and t → βη t 2 then there exists t 3 such that t 1 → Without loss of generality, we may assume t 1 → ≤β t 2 , i.e., the reduction t 1 ։ ≤β t 2 consists of a single step. Then t 2 ≡ λf.Ξt 
. It is impossible that t 2 1 (f x) is a redex with t 2 1 a constant. Indeed, then f x ≻ <β ρ for some canonical ρ. Using the definition of ≻ and noting that a term of the form f xw 1 . . . w k is not a → γ -redex for any γ because f is a variable, we may conclude that f xw 1 . . . w n ≻ γ ρ ′ for some γ, w 1 , . . . , w n and some canonical ρ ′ of type o or base type. But this contradicts the definition of ≻ γ . Therefore, the only remaining possibility is s ≡ λx.t . By the IH we obtain t 2 2 ∼ <α τ 2 . Therefore t 2 ∼ α τ 1 → τ 2 by (F).
If t 1 ∼ α τ 1 → τ 2 follows by (F ′ ) then t 1 ≡ λf.Ξt We show (2). If t 1 ≡ ρ then t 1 is in R β -normal form, so there is nothing to prove. If t 1 ≡ ρ, t 1 ≻ α ρ and t 1 ։ ≤β t 2 , where ρ ∈ T τ1→τ2 , then by definition for all ρ 1 ∈ T τ1 we have t 1 ρ 1 ❀ <α ρ 2 , where ρ 2 ≡ F (ρ)(ρ 1 ). But then by parts (1) and (2) of the inductive hypothesis t 2 ρ 1 ❀ <α ρ 2 , so t 2 ≻ α ρ. Therefore suppose t 1 ≻ α ⊤. When t 1 ≻ α ⊥ the argument is similar. If α = 0 then the claim is obvious, because the right sides of the identities in the postulates for t 1 ≻ 0 ⊤ are normal forms. If α > 0 then assume t 1 ։ ≤β t 2 , t 1 ≡ Ξt . By (4), which has already been verified in this inductive step, we obtain t 1 2 ∼ α τ . It therefore suffices to check that for all t 3 ∈ T τ we have t 2 2 t 3 ❀ <α ⊤. But for t 3 ∈ T τ obviously t 2 1 t 3 ❀ <α ⊤, so t 2 2 t 3 ❀ <α ⊤ by parts (1) and (2) of the IH. We show (6). Suppose t ∼ α ω. When t ∼ α ε the argument is similar. If t ∼ α ω is obtained by rule (Kω) then the claim is obvious. If t ∼ α ω is obtained by (F) then t ≡ λf.Ξt 1 (λx.t 2 (f x)) with f, x / ∈ F V (t 1 , t 2 ), t 1 ∼ <α τ 1 and t 2 ∼ <α τ 2 . Because τ = ω we must have τ 1 = ε or τ 2 = ω. Since tr → β Ξt 1 (λx.t 2 (rx)) it suffices to show Ξt 1 (λx.t 2 (rx)) ≻ <α ⊤. If τ 1 = ε then this follows from (Ξ ⊤ ) because T ε = ∅. So assume τ 2 = ω. Let γ < α be such that t 1 ∼ γ τ 1 and t 2 ∼ γ ω. Let t 3 ∈ T τ1 . By part (6) of the IH we have (λx. 
)(rx)) ≻ <α ⊤ is analogous to the case for (F).
We show (5). Suppose t ∼ α τ 1 and t ∼ β τ 2 . If t ≡ A τ for τ ∈ B or t ≡ H then the claim is obvious. So suppose t ≡ A τ for τ ∈ B and t ≡ H. First assume that both t ∼ α τ 1 and t ∼ β τ 2 are obtained by rule 
So by Lemma 4.2.4 we have τ 1 , τ 2 ∈ {ω, ε}. For instance, suppose τ 1 = ω and τ 2 = ε. By (6) and its dual, which we have already verified in this inductive step, for all t 3 we have tt 3 ❀ <α ⊤ and tt 3 ❀ <β ⊥. By parts (1) and (2) of the IH this implies the existence of t 4 such that t 4 ≻ <α ⊤ and t 4 ≻ <β ⊥, which contradicts part (3) of the IH.
It remains to verify (3). If τ ∈ B then this is obvious. Suppose τ = τ 1 → τ 2 ∈ T 1 . Note that for all t 1 ∈ T τ1 we have F (ρ 1 )(t 1 ) ≡ F (ρ 2 )(t 1 ). This follows from the definition of ≻ α for τ = τ 1 → τ 2 ∈ T 1 , from parts (1), (2) and (3) of the IH, and from the fact that canonical terms are in normal form. Now, if τ 1 = ω then ρ 1 ≡ λx.ρ ′ 1 and ρ 2 ≡ λx.ρ ′ 2 . Thus for any t 1 we have ρ
the claim is immediate, because T τ1→τ2 = Σ τ1→τ2 for τ 1 = ω was defined to contain exactly one constant for every function from T τ1 to T τ2 .
The last remaining case is τ = o. Thus, suppose t ≻ α ⊤ and t ≻ β ⊥. It is easily seen that this is possible only when the conditions (Ξ ⊤ ) and (Ξ ⊥ ) are satisfied. So we have t ≡ Ξt 1 t 2 and there exists τ 1 such that t 1 ∼ α τ 1 and for all t ′ ∈ T τ1 we have t 2 t ′ ❀ <α ⊤. There also exists τ 2 and t 3 ∈ T τ2 such that t 1 ∼ β τ 2 and t 2 t 3 ❀ <β ⊥. But by (5) we have τ 1 = τ 2 . Hence t 2 t 3 ❀ <α ⊤ and t 2 t 3 ❀ <β ⊥, which contradicts the inductive hypothesis.
Corollary 4.2.6. If
Proof. Follows from conditions (1) and (2) Proof. If t 1 t 0 = ≤α t 2 t 0 for all terms t 0 then in particular t 1 x = ≤α t 2 x where x is variable which does not occur in t 1 and t 2 . Hence t 1 η ← λx.t 1 x = ≤α λx.t 2 x → η t 2 . Therefore t 1 = ≤α t 2 .
The rank of a type τ , denoted rank(τ ), is defined as follows. If τ ∈ B ∪ {o, ω, ε} then rank(τ ) = 1. Otherwise τ = τ 1 → τ 2 ∈ T 1 and we set rank(τ ) = max{rank(τ 1 ) + 1, rank(τ 2 )}. By the rank of a canonical term we mean the rank of its canonical type.
We write t ≫ α t ′ if there exists an n-ary context C, terms t 1 , . . . , t n , and canonical terms ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n , such that t i ≻ α ρ i for i = 1, . . . , n, t ≡ C[t 1 , . . . , t n ] and t ′ ≡ C[ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n ]. If the maximal rank of ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n is at most k then we write t ≫ k α t ′ , and if it is less than k we write t ≫ <k α t ′ . Recall that whenever we write C[t 1 , . . . , t n ] we assume that the free variables of t 1 , . . . , t n do not become bound in C[t 1 , . . . , t n ].
Lemma 4.2.9. If t ≻ α ρ and x 1 , . . . ,
Proof. Easy induction on k. 
2 ) then one of the following holds:
q there exist contexts C 1 , C 2 , terms t 1 , . . . , t k , and canonical terms ρ 1 , . . . , ρ k , such that t i ≻ α ρ i for i = 1, . . . , k, t ≡ λf. Recall that we use the notations R, ≻, ❀, ≫, etc. without subscripts to denote R ζ , ≻ ζ , ❀ ζ , ≫ ζ , etc., where ζ is the ordinal introduced just before Definition 4.1.11. For this ordinal we have ≻ ζ = ≻ <ζ , R ζ = R <ζ , etc. Lemma 4.2.12. If t 1 , t 2 , t 3 are terms, ρ is a canonical term, and τ is a type, then for every ordinal α and every natural number n the following conditions hold:
Proof. Induction on pairs n, α ordered lexicographically, i.e., n 1 , α 1 < n 2 , α 2 iff n 1 < n 2 , or n 1 = n 2 and α 1 < α 2 .
First we verify condition (2). Suppose t 1 ≫ n t 2 ∼ α τ . If t 2 ∼ α τ is obtained by rule (A) or (H) then t 2 ≡ A τ for τ ∈ B or t 2 ≡ H, so t 1 ≡ t 2 and the claim is obvious.
If t 2 ∼ α τ is obtained by rule (Kω) or (Kε) then t 2 ≡ Kt ′ 2 , τ ∈ {ω, ε} and t ′ 2 ❀ <α c where c ∈ {⊤, ⊥}, i.e., t
If t 2 ∼ α τ is obtained by rule (Fω) then τ = ω and t 2 ≡ λf.Ξr . We have τ = τ 1 → τ 2 , r 1 ≫ n r ′ 1 ∼ <α τ 1 and r 2 ≫ n r ′ 2 ∼ <α τ 2 . By part (2) of the IH we obtain r 1 ∼ τ 1 and r 2 ∼ τ 2 . Therefore t 1 ≡ F r 1 r 2 ∼ τ by rule (F).
If
′ 1 ∼ <α τ 1 and λz.r ′ 2 ∼ <α τ 2 . By Lemma 4.2.11 there are two cases.
By part (2) of the IH we obtain r 1 ∼ τ 1 and λz.r 2 ∼ τ 2 . Therefore t 1 ≡ F r 1 r 2 ∼ τ by rule (F ′ ).
• t 1 ≡ λf.Ξr 1 r 2 , z / ∈ F V (r ′
The remaining case is when t 2 ∼ α τ is obtained by rule (F ′′
Now we verify condition (1). If t 2 ≡ ρ then t 1 ≫ ρ. By (1) in Fact 4.1.3 we have ρ ≡ λx 1 . . . x n .c, so by definition of ≫, there exist a unary context C, a term t ′ , and a canonical term ρ
′ ∈ T τ , and ρ ∈ T ω k →τ , by (2) in Fact 4.1.3. By Lemma 4.2.9 we obtain
, so by part (3) of the inductive hypothesis there exists t
Using part (1) of the IH we obtain
We consider all possible forms of t 2 according to the definition of t 2 ≻ α ⊤. If t 2 ≡ A τ c for τ ∈ B then t 1 ≡ t 2 , because if c is a canonical constant of a base type τ then the condition t ≻ c implies t ≡ c. If t 2 ≡ ⊤ then t 1 ≻ t 2 ≡ ⊤ and the claim is obvious. Suppose condition
. By definition of ≻ α there exists τ such that r ′ 1 ∼ α τ and for all t 3 ∈ T τ we have r
1 ∼ α τ we conclude that r 1 ∼ τ by condition (2) which we have already verified in this inductive step. Because for all t 3 ∈ T τ we have r 2 t 3 ≫ n r ′ 2 t 3 ։ <α t ′ 3 ≻ <α ⊤, so by part (3) of the IH for all t 3 ∈ T τ there exists t ′′ 3 such that r 2 t 3 ։ R t ′′ 3 ≫ n t ′ 3 ≻ <α ⊤. Hence r 2 t 3 ❀ ⊤ by applying part (1) of the IH. Therefore t 1 ≻ ⊤ by the definition of ≻. Finally, assume the condition (L ⊤ ) in the definition of t 2 ≻ α ⊤ is satisfied. Then t 2 ≡ Lt ′ 2 with t ′ 2 ∼ α τ for some type τ . Since t 1 ≫ n t 2 we must have t 1 ≡ Lt
By condition (2), which we have already verified in this inductive step, we obtain t
It remains to prove (3). It suffices to consider a single reduction step, i.e., to show that
where r i ≻ ρ i and rank(ρ i ) ≤ n, for i = 1, . . . , k. Denote by C 0 [ρ 1 , . . . , ρ k ] the contracted redex in t 2 , where the boxes in C 0 correspond to appropriate boxes in C. By C e we denote the surrounding context satisfying
It follows from the definition of R α that there are four possibilities:
In the first two cases we have t
Otherwise the contraction in t 2 produces some canonical term ρ, i.e., C 0 [ρ 1 , . . . , ρ k ] → ≤α ρ. It suffices to prove:
Indeed, if (⋆) holds then simply take t
if t ≡ ρ then we take C e [ρ, ✷ 1 , . . . , ✷ k ] as the context required by the definition of ≫ n , otherwise we take C e noting that t ≻ ρ and rank(ρ) ≤ n.
by part (1) of the IH and the fact that
. . , r k ] → R ρ and we are done.
As in the previous paragraph we have
We have r ≻ ρ ′ and rank(ρ ′ ) < n, so r i r ≫ <n r i ρ ′ where the context required by the definition of ≫ <n is r i ✷. Since r i ≻ ρ i and the canonical type of ρ i is a function type, we conclude by definition of ≻ that
By part (3) of the inductive hypothesis there exists t such that r i r ։ ζ t ≫ <n ζ t ′ ≻ ρ. Applying part (1) of the IH we obtain t ≻ ρ. 
The above corollary states that our definition of ≻ is correct. If t ≻ ρ 1 then t behaves exactly like ρ 1 in every context C such that C[ρ 1 ] has an "interesting" interpretation.
The following final lemmas show that the conditions on T required for a classical illative model are satisfied by M.
Lemma 4.2.14.
Proof. Keeping in mind the convention regarding the meaning of Ht, we note that if
Then the condition (L ⊤ ) must hold, so Kt ∼ α τ for some type τ . By Lemma 4.2.4 we have τ = ω or τ = ε. Assume τ = ω. The other case is analogous. By (6) in Lemma 4.2.5 we have Ktt ❀ <α ⊤. Since Ktt → β t, by Corollary 4.2.6 we have t ❀ <α ⊤. Proof. Induction on α. If t ∼ α τ is obtained by rule (A), (H), (Kω) or (Kε), then the claim is obvious. If τ = ω then the claim follows from (6) in Lemma 4.2.5. If τ = ε then the claim is also obvious. So we may assume τ = τ 1 → τ 2 / ∈ {ω, ε}. Then the only remaining cases are when t ∼ τ is obtained by (F) or (F ′ ). Then t = β F t 1 t 2 , τ = τ 1 → τ 2 , t 1 ∼ <α τ 1 and t 2 ∼ <α τ 2 . Suppose t 0 ∈ T τ1→τ2 . Then for all r 1 ∈ T τ1 there exists r 2 ∈ T τ2 such that t 0 r 1 ։ R r 2 , by Definition 4.1.8, because if τ 1 = ω then r 1 ≻ r 1 by Lemma 4.2.15. Also, we have F t 1 t 2 t 0 = ≤0 Ξt 1 λy.t 2 (t 0 y). Hence (λy.t 2 (t 0 y))r 1 ։ R t 2 r 2 . Because t 2 ∼ <α τ 2 , we have t 2 r 2 ❀ ⊤ by the IH, so (λy.t 2 (t 0 y))r 1 ❀ ⊤. Therefore Ξt 1 λy.t 2 (t 0 y) ≻ ⊤ by condition (Ξ ⊤ i ). Hence, by Corollary 4.2.6, we obtain F t 1 t 2 t ′ ❀ ⊤.
Lemma 4.2.17. If t 1 ∼ α τ , τ = ω, τ = ε and t 1 t 2 ❀ ⊤, then t 2 ❀ ρ for some ρ ∈ T τ .
Proof. Induction on α. If t 1 ∼ α τ is obtained by rule (A) then t 1 ≡ A τ for τ ∈ B, and
. By Definition 4.1.8 we have t ′ 2 ≡ c for c ∈ T τ . Hence t 2 ❀ c. If t 1 ∼ α τ is obtained by rule (H) then t 1 ≡ H and t 2 ❀ c ∈ {⊤, ⊥} by Lemma 4.2.14.
The only remaining case is when t 1 ∼ α τ = τ 1 → τ 2 is obtained by (F) or (F ′ ). Then t 1 = β F r 1 r 2 ∼ α τ = τ 1 → τ 2 where r 1 ∼ <α τ 1 , r 2 ∼ <α τ 2 . We may assume τ 1 = ε, τ 2 = ω and τ 2 = ε, since otherwise τ = ω or τ = ε. By Corollary 4.2.6 we have Ξr 1 λy.r 2 (t 2 y) ❀ ⊤, so Ξr is satisfied, i.e., there exists τ ′ such that r ′ 1 ∼ τ ′ and for all t 3 ∈ T τ ′ we have r ′ 2 t 3 ❀ ⊤. By (4) in Lemma 4.2.5 we have r ′ 1 ∼ <α τ 1 , so it follows from (5) in Lemma 4.2.5 that τ ′ = τ 1 . Therefore for any t 3 ∈ T τ1 we have r ′ 2 t 3 ❀ ⊤. Since r 2 (t 2 t 3 ) = ≤0 (λy.r 2 (t 2 y))t 3 ։ R r ′ 2 t 3 , we obtain by Corollary 4.2.6 that r 2 (t 2 t 3 ) ❀ ⊤ for any t 3 ∈ T τ1 . Because r 2 ∼ <α τ 2 where τ 2 = ω and τ 2 = ε, we conclude by the inductive hypothesis that the following condition holds:
(⋆) for all t 3 ∈ T τ1 there exists ρ 2 ∈ T τ2 such that t 2 t 3 ❀ ρ 2 .
Note that ρ 2 depends on t 3 . If τ 1 = ω then T τ1→τ2 contains a constant for every set-theoretical function from T τ1 to T τ2 . In particular it contains a constant c such that for every ρ 1 ∈ T τ1 we have F (c)(ρ 1 ) ≡ ρ 2 where ρ 2 ∈ T τ2 is a term depending on ρ 1 such that t 2 ρ 1 ❀ ρ 2 . Such a ρ 2 exists by (⋆). Therefore by definition of ≻ we have t 2 ≻ c ∈ T τ . If τ 1 = ω then it suffices to show that there exists a single ρ ′ ∈ T τ2 such that for all t 3 we have t 2 t 3 ❀ ρ ′ . Indeed, if this holds then t 2 ≻ Kρ ′ ∈ T ω→τ2 = T τ . Let x be a variable. Obviously x ∈ T ω , so by (⋆) there exists ρ ′ ∈ T τ2 such that t 2 x ❀ ρ ′ , i.e., t 2 x ։ R t ′ ≻ ρ ′ for some term t ′ . Taking C ≡ t 2 ✷, we conlude by conditon (1) • If Lt 1 ❀ ⊤ and for all t 3 such that t 1 t 3 ❀ ⊤ we have t 2 t 3 ❀ ⊤, then Ξt 1 t 2 ❀ ⊤.
• If Lt 1 ❀ ⊤ and for all t 3 such that t 1 t 3 ❀ ⊤ we have H(t 2 t 3 ) ❀ ⊤, then H(Ξt 1 t 2 ) ❀ ⊤.
• If Lt 1 ❀ ⊤, and either Lt 2 ❀ ⊤ or there is no t 3 such that
Proof. Suppose Lt 1 ❀ ⊤. By definitions we have t 1 ։ R t ′ 1 ∼ τ for some type τ . Assume that for all t 3 such that t 1 t 3 ❀ ⊤ we have t 2 t 3 ❀ ⊤. Let t 0 ∈ T τ . Then by Lemma 4.2.16 we obtain t ′ 1 t 0 ❀ ⊤. Because t 1 t 0 = R t ′ 1 t 0 , by Corollary 4.2.6 we conclude t 1 t 0 ❀ ⊤. Then by assumption
Assume that for all t 3 such that t 1 t 3 ❀ ⊤ we have H(t 2 t 3 ) ❀ ⊤, so t 2 t 3 ❀ ⊤ or t 2 t 3 ❀ ⊥ by Lemma 4.2.14. If for all t 3 such that t 1 t 3 ❀ ⊤ we have t 2 t 3 ❀ ⊤, then Ξt 1 t 2 ❀ ⊤ by the previous paragraph. Otherwise using Lemma 4.2.16, Corollary 4.2.6 and (Ξ ⊥ ) we may conclude Ξt 1 t 2 ❀ ⊥ by an argument analogous to the previous paragraph. In any case H(Ξt 1 t 2 ) ❀ ⊤ by (L ⊤ ), and (Kω) or (Kε). Proof. We verify that the structure M constructed in Definition 4.1.11 is a one-state classical illative model for I c ω . It follows from Lemma 4.2.8 that the combinatory algebra of M is extensional. Corollary 4.2.6 implies that [t] R ∈ T is equivalent to t ❀ ⊤. We need to check the conditions stated in Fact 3.8. Conditions (1), (3) and (4) follow from Lemma 4.2.18. Condition (2) follows from Lemma 4.2.19. Conditions (5), (6) and (7) follow from definitions.
It is also easy to see that M ΞHI. Indeed, otherwise we would have ΞHI ❀ ⊤, which is possible only when (Ξ ⊤ ) is satisfied for ΞHI. Thus H ∼ τ for some type τ , and for all t ∈ T τ we have It ❀ ⊤, so t ❀ ⊤ by Corollary 4.2.6. It is easily verified by inspecting the definitions that we must have τ = o. But then ⊥ ❀ ⊤ which is impossible by Corollary 4.2.7.
Therefore, by the soundness part of Theorem 3.6, the term ΞHI is not derivable in I c ω , and hence neither in I ω , which is a subsystem of I c ω .
The embedding
In this section a syntactic translation from the terms of PRED2 0 into the terms of I 0 is defined and proven complete for I 0 . The translation is a slight extension of that from [BBD93] . The method of the completeness proof is by model construction analogous to that in the previous section. Relinquishing quantification over predicates and restricting arguments of functions to base types allows us to significantly simplify this construction and to extend it to more than one state.
We use the notation T for the set of types of PRED2 0 . Recall that T is defined by the grammar T ::= o | B | B → T , where B is a specific set of base types. We assume that B corresponds exactly to the base types used in the definiton of I 0 . We fix a signature for PRED2 0 , and by Σ τ denote the set of constants of type τ in this signature. We always assume that all variables of PRED2 0 are present in the set of variables of I 0 .
Recall that by T(Σ) we denote the set of type-free lambda terms over a set of primitive constants Σ, which is assumed to contain Ξ, L and A τ for each τ ∈ B. We also assume that Σ contains every constant c ∈ Σ τ for any τ ∈ T . For the sake of uniformity, we will sometimes use the notation A o for H. For every composite type τ = τ 1 → τ 2 ∈ T we inductively define A τ = F A τ1 A τ2 . We use the same notational conventions concerning Kt, Ht, etc. as in Section 4.
Definition 5.1. We define inductively a map ⌈−⌉ from the terms of PRED2 0 to T(Σ) as follows:
• ⌈x⌉ = x for a variable x,
• ⌈c⌉ = c for a constant c,
• ⌈ϕ ⊃ ψ⌉ = ⌈ϕ⌉ ⊃ ⌈ψ⌉,
We extend the map to finite sets of formulas by defining ⌈∆⌉ to be the image of ⌈−⌉ on ∆. We also define a mapping Γ from sets of formulas to subsets of T(Σ), which is intended to provide a context for a set of formulas. For a finite set of formulas ∆ we define Γ(∆) to contain the following:
• A τ x for all x ∈ F V (∆) s.t. x ∈ V τ , and all types τ ,
• A τ c for all c ∈ Σ τ , and all types τ ,
• LA τ for all τ ∈ B,
• A τ y for all τ ∈ B and some y ∈ V τ such that y / ∈ F V (∆).
Lemma 5.2. For any τ ∈ T and any ∆ there exists a term t such that Γ(∆) ⊢ I0 A τ t.
Proof. First note that by a straightforward induction on the size of τ we obtain Γ(∆) ⊢ LA τ for any type τ . We prove the lemma by induction on the size of τ . If τ ∈ B then A τ y ∈ Γ(∆) for some variable y. If τ = o then notice that e.g. ⊢ H(LH). If τ = τ 1 → τ 2 then we need to prove that Γ(∆) ⊢ F A τ1 A τ2 t for some term t. Because Γ(∆) ⊢ LA τ1 , it suffices to show that Γ(∆), A τ1 x ⊢ A τ2 (tx) for some term t and some x / ∈ F V (Γ(∆), t). By the inductive hypothesis there exists a term t 2 such that Γ(∆) ⊢ A τ2 t 2 . So just take x / ∈ F V (Γ(∆), t 2 ) and t ≡ Kt 2 .
Theorem 5.3. The embedding is sound, i.e.,
Proof. Induction on the length of derivation of ∆ ⊢ PRED2 0 ϕ, using Lemma 3.2. The only interesting case is with modus-ponens, as from the inductive hypothesis we may only directly derive the judgement ⌈∆⌉, Γ(∆, ψ), Γ(ϕ) ⊢ I0 ⌈ψ⌉. To get rid of Γ(ϕ) on the left, we note that if
It is not difficult to show by induction on the length of derivation that ⌈∆⌉, Γ(∆, ψ), Γ(ϕ)[x/t ′ ] ⊢ I0 ⌈ψ⌉, i.e., that we may change A τ x on the left to A τ t ′ . To eliminate A τ t ′ altogether, it remains to notice that if Γ, t 1 ⊢ I0 t 2 and Γ ⊢ I0 t 1 then Γ ⊢ I0 t 2 .
If we had extended our semantics for PRED2 0 a bit by allowing non-constant domains, then we could also give a relatively simple semantic proof by transforming any illative Kripke model for I 0 to a Kripke model for PRED2 0 , and appealing to the completeness part of Theorem 3.6.
The rest of this section is devoted to proving that the embedding is also complete.
Let N be a Kripke model for PRED2 0 . We will now construct an illative Kripke model M such that M will "mirror" N , i.e., exactly the translations of true statements in a state of N will be true in the corresponding state of M. This construction is the crucial step in the completeness proof. It is similar to the construction given in Section 4. For the rest of this section we assume a fixed N .
We define a set of primitive constants Σ + and the sets Σ τ of canonical constants of type τ , just like in Definition 4.1.2, but restricting ourselves only to the types in T (i.e. the types of PRED2 0 ). Note that there is a bijection δ τ between Σ τ and D N τ . We often drop the subscript in δ τ . We also include in Σ + an infinite set Σ ν of external constants. Note that Σ + is disjoint from the signature Σ of M which we defined earlier. The terms over Σ form the syntax. The terms over Σ + are used to build the model. To every constant c ∈ Σ corresponds exactly one constant c + ∈ Σ + such that c N = δ(c + ). This correspondence, however, need not be injective, as there may be another constant c
. Let S be the set of states of N . By ⊤ ∈ Σ o we denote the constant such that ς N (δ(⊤)) = S, and by ⊥ ∈ Σ o the constant such that ς N (δ(⊥)) = ∅. In what follows ρ, ρ ′ , etc., stand for ⊤ or ⊥. Note that Σ o may contain other elements in addition to ⊤ and ⊥. In this section we use t, t 1 , t 2 , etc., for closed terms, unless otherwise stated.
Definition 5.4. We construct a reduction system R as follows. The terms of R are the type-free lambda-terms over Σ + . The reduction rules of R are as follows:
• rules of β-and η-reduction,
It is easy to see that R has the Church-Rosser property. When α > 0 we postulate t ≻ s α ⊤ for all closed terms t such that one of the following holds: (Ξ ⊤ ) t ≡ ΞA τ t 1 where τ ∈ B ∪ {o} and t 1 is such that for all s ′ ≥ s and all c ∈ Σ τ we have
Finally, we postulate t ≻ s α ⊥ for α ≥ 0 and all closed terms t such that one of the following holds:
(Ξ ⊥ ) t ≡ ΞA τ t 1 and τ ∈ B ∪ {o}, and
• for all c ∈ Σ τ and all s ′ ≥ s we have t 1 c ❀ [Cza13] is false, because of the presence of type ε. To correct this we need to separately consider the case when Ξ encodes implication, which is done here by means of the rules (P ⊤ ) and (P ⊥ ). This change requires reworking the subsequent correctness proof.
With the corrected definition, it is not obvious that for α ≤ β we have ≻ Proof. This follows by an easy induction on α, using the Church-Rosser property of R.
Proof. Induction on α. First note that the inductive hypothesis and Corollary 5.8 imply:
(⋆) if t ❀ s <α ⊤ then t ❀ <α ⊥. Now, we check the conditions (1) and (2).
(1) The problem is with the universal quantification in (P ⊤ ) and (P ⊥ ). For instance, consider (P ⊤ ),
i.e., t ≡ Ξ(Kt 1 )t 2 ≻ s β ⊤ for some β < α, with: Definition 5.13. The structure M is defined as follows. We define the extensional combinatory algebra C of M to be the set of equivalence classes of = R on closed terms. We take the set S of states of N to be the set of states of M as well. Lemma 5.14. Let t 1 and t 2 be closed terms. If for all closed t 3 we have t 1 t 3 = R t 2 t 3 , then t 1 = R t 2 .
Proof. If t 1 t 3 = R t 2 t 3 for all closed t 3 , then in particular t 1 ν = R t 2 ν for an external constant ν not occuring in t 1 and t 2 . By the Church-Rosser property of R there exists t such that t 1 ν ։ R t and t 2 ν ։ R t. Because there are no rules in R involving ν, and ν cannot be produced by any of the reductions, it is easy to verify by induction on the number of reduction steps that t ≡ C ′ [ν], t 1 ν ≡ C 1 [ν], t 2 ν ≡ C 2 [ν], C 1 ։ R C ′ and C 2 ։ R C ′ , where ν does not occur in C 1 , C 2 or C ′ . Hence t 1 x ≡ C 1 [x] = R C 2 [x] ≡ t 2 x for a variable x, and thus λx.t 1 x = R λx.t 2 x. Because R contains the rule of η-reduction, we conclude that t 1 = R t 2 . Proof. Because there are no rules in R involving ρ, the claim is easy to verify by induction on the number of reduction steps.
The following lemma is a much simplified analogon of Lemma 4.2.12. Then by inspecting the definitions we see that there are the following two possibilities.
• If C ′ ≡ ✷ and ρ 1 ≡ ρ 2 then the claim is obvious.
• If C ′ ≡ H✷ and ρ 2 ≡ ⊤, then either t ≻ ⊤ or t ≻ ⊥. Thus Ht ≻ ⊤ by condition (H ⊤ ).
Now let α > 0. If C ′ ≡ ΞA τ C 1 and ρ 2 = ⊤ then for all c ∈ Σ τ and all s ′ ≥ s we have C This finishes the more difficult part of the construction correctness proof. As in Section 4 it remains to prove several simple lemmas implying that M satisfies the conditions imposed on an illative Kripke model for I 0 . For convenience we reformulate the definition of an illative Kripke model for I 0 in terms of the notions used to construct M.
• t ։ R Kt ′ with t ′ ❀ s ⊤ or t ′ ❀ s ⊥.
Proof. Easy inspection of the rules in the definition of ≻ s α . That the conditions are exclusive is a consequence of the Church-Rosser property of R.
Lemma 5.20. The following conditions are satisfied.
• If Lt 1 ❀ s ⊤ and for all s ′ ≥ s and all t 3 such that t 1 t 3 ❀
Remarks and open problems
Remark 6.1. In this paper we use lambda-calculus with βη-equality. Lambda-calculus with β-equality or combinatory logic with weak equality could be used instead. The proofs and definitions would only need minor adjustments.
Remark 6.2. It is clear that the methods presented here may be used to prove completeness of the embedding of propositional second-order logic into an extension of IP from [BBD93] . This extension of IP is essentially I 0 but with rules P i , P e , P H from Lemma 3.2 instead of the more general rules for Ξ. Whether such an extension is complete for second-order propositional logic was posed as an open problem in [BBD93] . The open problem related to I 0 given in [BBD93] was whether full second-order predicate logic may be faithfully embedded into it. We do not know the answer to this question. One problem with extending our methods was already noted in Remark 5.11. It is not straightforward to extend our construction to obtain a model with quantification over predicates and more than one state. Another obstacle is that our construction of a model for I
